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Abstract
Verification of concurrent systems with thousands of multiple threads and transactions is a challenging problem
not just for simulation or emulation but also for formal. To get designs to work correctly and provide optimal PPA
the designers often use complex optimizations requiring sharing of multiple resources amongst active threads and
transactions using FIFOs, stallers, pipelining, out-of-order scheduling, and complex layered arbitration. This is true of
most non-trivial designs irrespective of a specific application domain such as CPU, GPU or communication. At the
outset a lot of these application domains look diverse and complex; however at some level of detail all of these employ
common design principles of sequencing, load balancing, arbitration and hazard prevention. We present in this paper a
key abstraction based methodology for verifying ordering correctness and arbitration across a range of designs which
are derived from different application domains. We show how by using transaction tracking abstractions and supporting
them with invariants one can not only find deep corner case bugs in sequentially very deep designs; we can also build
exhaustive proofs to prove the absence of critical bugs such as deadlock, starvation, and loss of data integrity. We
present experimental results on a range of different designs and show that on some of the designs such as FIFOs we
can verify over 100 different types of FIFOs for ordering correctness using a single assertion in a single testbench. We
also show how the methodology of FIFO verification can be adapted to verify over half-a-dozen different types of arbiters
including a very complex memory subsystem arbiter. We then verify a multi-clocked synchronizer and a packet based
design from a networking domain using the same abstraction as used in FIFO verification. The results demonstrate
that by using our methodology one can build scalable formal verification testbenches which can be both reusable and
compact, and can be used to find deep corner case bugs as well as establish exhaustively the absence of bugs through
proofs.
1 INTRODUCTION
Several industry estimates point to an increase in costs of hardware verification. A notable study done
recently [1] uncovers that “the average total project time spent in verification in 2014 was 57%”, with
20-25% projects reported to have consumed as much as 60-70% time in verification and about 10% of the
projects in excess of 80%. Hardware designs are shrinking in die size and are getting more energy efficient,
however the feature set of requirements these designs need to have is increasing — specially as the use
models are getting more diverse and pervasive from internet-of-things (IoT) to automotive, avionics and
medical electronics. Meeting schedules on time and providing rigorously verified systems is becoming
a daunting challenge which can only be addressed through rigorous verification techniques grounded in
formal methods. Even though test based techniques based in simulation and emulation are an integral part
of any verification plan, they often are not the best choice as it takes longer to implement these and also
longer to run. It is not feasible to continue to extend the time taken for regression testing, even with the use
of emulation and large server farms. Also, neither simulation nor emulation can ever provide the much
needed rigor and often coverage is the only way to sign-off — which for domains such as automotive may
not be necessarily adequate.
Verification of concurrent systems with thousands of multiple threads and transactions is a challenging
problem not just for simulation or emulation but also for formal. To get designs to work correctly and
provide optimal power, performance and area (PPA) the designers often use complex optimizations
requiring sharing of multiple resources amongst active threads and transactions using FIFOs, stallers,
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pipelining, out-of-order scheduling, and complex layered arbitration. This is true of most non-trivial
designs we build irrespective of a specific application domain such as CPU, GPU or communication.
At the outset a lot of these application domains look diverse and complex; however at some level of
detail all of these employ common design principles of sequencing, load balancing, arbitration and hazard
prevention.
In this paper we present an abstraction based methodology for verifying designs that require ordering
correctness and arbitration which are derived from different application domains. We introduce a family
of abstractions built around tracking transactions and splitting scenarios and show how by using these one
can not only find corner case bugs in sequentially deep designs; we can also build exhaustive proofs to
mathematically prove the absence of critical bugs such as deadlock, starvation, and loss of data integrity.
1.1 Organization of the paper
In the following section we present some context by summarizing background work in the field of
problem reduction, abstraction and model checking. In Section 3, we present a brief introduction to
SystemVerilog assertions (SVA) that we have used in our work. We then present our first case study
of a FIFO in Section 4 and introduce our first key abstractions in that section. In Section 5, we show how
the fundamental abstractions introduced for FIFO verification are used in verifying a simple arbiter. In
Section 6 we introduce a new abstraction and show how this one together with the abstractions used for
FIFO verification is used to verify a more complex memory subsystem arbiter. In Section 7, we show how
multi-clocked synchronizers are verified for data integrity and finally our last case study of packet based
design verification is discussed in Section 8 where we show how a packet based design where packets
can be dropped, shrunk or grown can be verified using the abstraction used for verifying FIFOs. We then
provide a detailed comparison of our work in Section 9 with other closely related pieces of work and
finally conclude in Section 10 with our key findings and contributions.
2 BACKGROUND WORK
Abstraction [2], [3] has been a classic technique used to cope with verification complexity for nearly 40
years. Since the invention of model checking [4], [5], [6] abstraction has been deployed in numerous
forms in verification of hardware [7], [8], [9], [10] as well as software [11]. The most challenging aspect in
deploying abstraction successfully is to devise one in the first place that is relevant to the target application
and to establish that the abstraction used is appropriate and safe. Appropriate means the abstraction should
not abstract away so much of the underlying design that one starts getting spurious errors (failures that
aren’t reflective of real bugs). The abstraction is safe if it does not abstract away so much of the design
to get proofs to exhaustively complete on an unrealistically simplified design and ends up missing bugs
in the original un-abstracted design. It is well known that if one is able to build a proof on an abstracted
design model that proof holds for the original design as well [3]. However, one must keep the delicate
nature of abstraction in mind to ensure that we do not end up computing abstractions that produce the
above mentioned problems. Establishing that the abstraction is a safe one and will not prevent one from
unearthing some bugs that may exist in the original unabstracted design is a delicate art.
Often it may be possible to build a proof that these abstractions are safe by theoretically establishing a
Galois connection [2], [12]. The absence of a Galois connection however does not limit the practical use of
abstraction [9], [10]. We do however appreciate that we need to check that abstractions we use are indeed
safe. In our case we make use of mutation based testing to establish that abstractions are safe and we have
not missed bugs in the original design through our abstractions. This is our preferred choice of method
currently in establishing safety of our abstractions.
The use of symmetry based reduction has been significant in the verification of cache-coherency pro-
tocols [13], [14], [9], in the verification of hardware designs [15] and in verification of telecommunication
protocols [16]. McMillan [9] notably used assume guarantee reasoning to verify hardware designs with
loops. The idea here was to break the circularity to assume one half of the design works to prove the other
and then assume the half just proven to prove the other half of the loop. Melham et al [17] showed how
symbolic indexing can be used to efficiently encode numerous cases required to verify some hardware
designs.
Data independence [18], [19], [10] is a very powerful technique in verifying systems where the data
simply moves within the design or a program without changing its value. Its correspondence with
symmetry [20] has been shown to be a very effective way of applying data-independence techniques
on systems with symmetry.
3 A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMVERILOG ASSERTIONS
We assume familiarity with Verilog programming language. Though most of our methodology is grounded
in SystemVerilog Assertions [21], it does not assume familiarity with the full set of SystemVerilog (SV).
On the contrary, we only ever use a tiny subset of SV and employ mostly Verilog for modelling glue logic
and wrap that with SV properties. Properties in SV form the core of what is known as SystemVerilog
Assertions (SVA). SVA and and Property Specification Language (PSL) [22] are both languages used for
writing assertions and are mostly used with model checkers although in some cases they can also be
employed to capture checkers for sequential equivalence checking as well as dynamic simulation based
checking.
Both these assertion languages are used in industry and are based on Linear Temporal Logic [23].
SVA however has been adopted a lot more than PSL and is certainly the standard assertion language
used in Imagination Technologies. These languages come with a rich repertoire for modelling Boolean
expressions and also complex temporal expressions called sequences built by applying temporal operators
such as single cycle implication, next cycle implication, and repetition operators to model consecutive or non-
consecutive repetition as well as liveness properties. As much as these assertion languages are well endowed
with features modeling time-dependent behaviour it is non-trivial to model complex time-dependent
behaviour for end-to-end checks in these languages. It is also not clear how easy it is to reuse these
properties for other similar designs just by using SVA without any supporting modeling.
The usage of the word assertions in SVA is somewhat legacy as clearly assertions only make a part
of the SVA and in fact it is the properties that are the building blocks of the formal layer of SVA. One
can express combinational or sequential behaviour by defining properties in SVA using a very rich set
of syntactic sugar that SVA provides and then one can assert that a property should always hold of the
outputs or (in some cases of internal state) of RTL design at all times using the keyword assert property.
To model realistic behaviour we often need to capture real world constraints that will restrict the behaviour
of the inputs of the design to only a subset of interesting attributes. This is accomplished by using the
keyword assume property in SVA which states that at all times, the behaviour on an input of the design
is always true. This forces an automated formal tool such as a model checker or an equivalence checker
to use this to force some of the inputs of the design to always have the behaviour captured by an assume
property in order to prove that the required behaviour at all times expressed by assert property is valid.
In many situations it is desirable that some behaviours are not always true but may be true some time.
For example, one would not want a FIFO to be always empty, or always full; but may want to check
that a FIFO does become empty or full sometime. This is captured by using a construct in SVA called a
cover property.
We do not have space to provide a detailed introduction to SVA here but we would like to introduce
just those preliminaries of SVA here that would be needed to appreciate our modelling and case studies
in the later section. We show concisely in a table the essential SVA we need to use in our paper. One
expr1 && expr2 Logical ‘and’ of expr1 and expr2 A |-> B When A holds B must hold in same cycle
expr1 || expr2 Logical ‘or’ of expr1 and expr2 A |=> B When A holds B must hold in next cycle
expr1 & expr2 Bitwise ‘and’ of expr1 and expr2 ##N expr expr holds after N cycles
expr1 | expr2 Bitwise ‘or’ of expr1 and expr2 ##[0:$] expr The expr holds eventually
!expr Logical negation of expr $stable(expr) The expr value doesn’t change with time
TABLE 1
A quick primer on SVA syntax showing some of the commonly used operators in SVA. Combinational fragment of SVA is shown in the left column
and temporal fragment in the right column.
important aspect to remember when using properties in SVA is that they are mostly clocked when they
are meant to capture time based behaviour. This is so that the model checkers do not have to check or
assume the behaviour when the clock is not toggling and this makes the model checking very efficient. In
fact it is not a requirement that one has to use a clock, any event can be used as long as it is has an edge
like clocks have positive (posedge) and negative (negedge).
The template for modelling properties then becomes:
[assert|assume|cover] property (@(posedge clock) ...);
where one can use one of the keywords between assert, assume and cover and the three dots denote
a combinational expression or a temporal expression such as the ones shown in Table 3.
If we do not want to explicitly use the edge qualifier @(posedge clock) one can define default clocking
blocks and then we no longer have to qualify explicitly the clock edge in the property. However, we
must be careful when verifying designs with multiple clocks as is the case in Section 7 where we do
have to explicitly qualify multi-clocks and edges. However, when these are not specified explicitly in our
presentation we can safely assume that we have used default clocking blocks. The default clocking in SVA
for the clock clk in our design is specified as:
default clocking cb @(posedge clk);
endclocking
A note on notations and results: Our models used in formal are designed using a synthesizable subset of
Verilog using the standard registers and wires. When we show our modelling code we will not show the
declarations of wires and registers as this may become obvious from the way these signals are assigned
values in Verilog. Only when it is essential to show key aspects of data structures we will explicitly show
these declarations. Also, one needs a begin and end with for loops in Verilog but we will omit this in the
presentation to save space and enhance readability. Due to the model checker not able to report CPU times
when using certain solvers based, we are only able to report real time or wall-clock time for some of our
case studies which is of course more pessimistic than CPU times.
4 THE CASE OF A HUMBLE FIFO
A FIFO is one of the most used components in a SoC design. Several implementations are possible but
some are better than others for power and area. Though FIFOs are often classed as somewhat trivial
components we have seen that in practice it is quite easy to have a bug in one of these components
specially when power based optimizations are implemented. Moreover, formal verification in the presence
of FIFOs is often considered difficult; in some cases infeasible to an extent that it is suggested that black-
boxing is necessary. In practice, we cannot black-box them all the time as they are part of essential control
flow. Moreover not verifying them exhaustively in the presence of power based optimizations is not an
ideal choice. Imagination Technologies has a library of design components including FIFOs and when
we investigated building a formal test bench to verify one of these we soon realized having an end-
to-end check for establishing the key correctness properties was essential so we can reuse these checks
regardless of the specific micro-architectural implementation of a given FIFO. Most FIFOs have to satisfy
the following key properties:
R1 No data loss
R2 No data duplication
R3 No reordering allowed
R4 All data words accepted at the input are eventually received at the output
Most practitioners will agree that establishing exhaustively that checks (R1-R4) even for moderate sized
FIFOs (greater than 32 deep) is challenging for formal model checking. The reason for this is because the
state of each stored element in the FIFO depends on whatever else has been stored ahead of it; enforcing
sequential dependency (required for FIFO) but also making it harder for the model checkers to scale with
increasing depth as this dependency causes an exponential blow up in the size of BDDs or SAT based
model checking. This happens if one uses another golden FIFO design to verify a FIFO RTL using cycle-
accurate sequential equivalence checking. For an N deep FIFO with W wide data words; it will have
2(N ×W ) states reachable from reset; and if one introduces another FIFO with these many states 2(N ×W )
then the model checker has to cope with a cross product of 2(N ×W ) × 2(N ×W ) states which makes the
problem significantly harder specially in those conditions where the depth N is a big number or when
FIFOs are used as design components in a bigger design.
4.1 Two Transaction Abstraction
Our first abstraction [24] shown on the right hand side in Figure 1, is known as the two transaction
abstraction. If we were using theorem provers to model such checks one can write the ordering property as
follows where seen in before and seen out before would be predicates. The predicate seen in before
would be valid if d1 arrived before d2 on the input interface and the predicate seen out before would be
valid if d1 appeared on the output interface before d2. The predicates themselves would be higher-order
functions that would take a time based function σ and the two data words d1 and d2 as arguments and
we would then exploit induction based techniques to prove the ordering property. The induction would
be carried out to establish that the property holds for all d1 and d2 and for all insertions of these in the
design at all time points at all possible locations inside the design.
∀d1d2. (d1 seen in before d2)⇒ (d1 seen out before d2)
In industry, the use of theorem provers is not as popular as model checkers as theorem provers cannot
provide counter-examples and cannot be run automatically as model checkers do. However, theorem
provers do not suffer from any scalability issues with increasing state in the design and certainly do not
have any state-space explosion problems that all model checkers have. A lot of our work in this paper is
motivated to offset any state-space explosion issues we have during model checking big designs.
We want our formal testbench to be simple, reusable and scalable and we decided that the best way
would be to build scoreboards similar to how they are built in dynamic simulation based testbenches.
However, we want to ensure that instead of tracking the state of every transaction (comprising 0s and
1s) - we only track the interesting ones. By interesting we mean exploiting symbolic transactions i.e., the
ones that are encoded using Boolean symbols and not encoded using explicit 0s and 1s. We also wanted to
make use of non-determinism to choose which symbolic transactions we will track. With formal the main
idea is that if one can prove a property about a non-deterministic symbolic transaction then the property is
true of all transactions. A symbolic transaction is defined in terms of a non-deterministic symbolic value.
First we choose a symbolic value in the design and then we define when to ‘start’ and ‘stop’ observing
this symbolic value. Non-determinism comes by keeping this symbolic value undriven in our model
and letting the model checker exercise all possible combinations of explicit 0s and 1s for this undriven
symbolic value at all times. This allows us to define observation windows for this symbolic value. The
non-deterministic, undriven symbolic value defined is often called as a watched data, or a watched symbolic
data. We use these interchangeably throughout our presentation.
A state-of-the-art model checker typically combines symbolic simulation (simulation using symbolic
values), value propagation and checking using BDD [25] and SAT [26] based algorithms. The model
checker itself will ensure that it instantiates the watched data with all possible data values (built over 0s
and 1s) and this is how exhaustive results are achieved by it. Before the model checking is started the
assertion in question is logically negated before it is combined with the RTL, constraints and the model in
the testbench to result in a Boolean formula. As these Boolean formulas are unfolded for every time point
during model checking they are sent to the SAT solvers to compute if there is a satisfying assignment of
Boolean values to variables (signals in the RTL, testbench and constraints) in this formula and if there is
one then at that time point a bug is found. This bug could be in the RTL, or in the constraints or in the
model of the testbench. A debug process can then identify the cause and fix the bug.
4.2 Building observation windows using symbolic variables
Our abstraction method relies on defining a ‘start’ and a ‘stop’ event for every watched data where a start
is defined as the point at which a given symbolic watched data is accepted at the input interface via some
handshake signals. The stop event is defined as the point of time where the symbolic watched data leaves
the design on the output interface using possibly a second set of handshake signals.
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Fig. 1. The Two Abstractions. On the left hand side is the smart tracker abstraction designed by tracking single symbolic arbitrary watched data
word while on the right hand side is the two transaction abstraction showing tracking of two symbolic arbitrary watched data words.
In our method we use two symbolic watched data words to track inside the FIFO and we assert that
if one came before the other then they leave in the same order in which they arrived in the design. The
choice of which words would be chosen as symbolic is left entirely non-deterministic and is configured at
run time by the model checking tool and it chooses to exercise all possible data values for the symbolic
watched data. We do not control when d1 and d2 appear on the input interface, or how far they are
separated (in time) by when they arrive on the inputs; all we do is to constrain that d1 arrives before d2.
We then check by asserting a property that d1 should always appear before d2 at the output interface. The
model checker tries inserting d1 and d2 at all possible locations within the FIFO at all possible time points
and tries to prove the asserted property. If it cannot fail the property it will build an exhaustive proof.
Please note that the choice of letting d1 come before d2 is completely arbitrary and we could have chosen
it otherwise. As long as the relative chronology is intact for both the symbolic values the design is keeping
all the input data correctly ordered.
The key to our model is in creating two set of registers — one that gets set when the watched data
appears on the input and another one that gets set when the sampled in watched data leaves on the output
port. We also factor in the abstract model an extra element of non-determinism to allow the sampled in
register to not just get set on the very first appearance of the watched data but also on later occurrences
of the watched data as well. The reason we do so is to make sure that if there was ever an instance of
multiple occurrences of data words on the input where a later occurrence is bugged (let us say its value
is changed in the course of a write handshake due to an RTL bug), we would be able to catch this bug.
If we do not allow this non-determinism in our abstract model then we will set the sampled in register
on the very first occurrence of a watched data and will not wait for a later occurrence thereby missing
the RTL bug. We accomplish this added non-determinism by using another un-driven wire in our model
called arbit window. We never drive this wire with any specific value and instead leave it for the model
checker to assign both a 0 and a 1 to capture the non-determinism at runtime. When this wire has the
value 1 and the watched data (e.g., in our case shown as d1 in the code below) appears at the input port
then the sampled in register (sampled in d1) will get set. If what is going to be chosen as the watched
data value appears at the input port and at that instant of time the wire arbit window is not 1, then the
sampled in register will not be set and the model will wait for another subsequent occurrence of d1 to
arrive. The model checker itself is obliged to create another instance of an incoming data value to be the
watched data value d1 when the arbit window is 1.
In our presentation we assume default clocking and therefore do not explicitly qualify asserts and
assumes with @(posedge clk). The parameter WIDTH is the size of the data word. A data word of width
WIDTH will have 2WIDTH explicit values built over 0s and 1s.
1 logic [WIDTH-1:0] d1;
2 assume property ($stable(d1));
3 assign w_hsk = w_req && w_ack;
4 assign r_hsk = r_req && r_ack;
5 assign seen_d1 = (w_data == d1) && w_hsk && !sampled_in_d1 && arbit_window;
6 always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)
7 if (!rst)
8 sampled_in_d1 <= 1’b0;
9 else
10 sampled_in_d1 <= seen_d1 || sampled_in_d1;
The seen d1 wire gets set when the watched data d1 appears on the input port on a write handshake and
it has not already been sampled in before and the arbit window wire is driven to 1. When seen d1 is 1
the sampled in d1 register is set and once set remains so. Lastly, to allow the model checker to work on
a fixed but arbitrary watched data d1 we need to explicitly keep it stable (fixed). This is done by using
an assume property in SVA to tell the model checking tool that the watched data is stable (we use the
$stable construct in SVA). Other signals controlling the read (r hsk) and write (w hsk) handshake are
also defined below in terms of read and write request/acknowledgment pairs respectively.
We now define a register (seen read) that detects a read on the output port. This is required as our
implementation has a one cycle delay between the read handshake and when any data appears at the
output data port.
1 always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)
2 if (!rst)
3 seen_read <= 1’b0;
4 else (r_hsk)
5 seen_read <= 1’b1;
We now define the event that detects that the watched data d1 has been read out. This happens when
there has been a prior sampling in of d1 and a read request (seen read) in the previous clock cycle and
the value read out on the r data port is indeed d1.
1 always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)
2 if (!rst)
3 sampled_out_d1 <= 1’b0;
4 else if (sampled_in_d1 && seen_read && (r_data==d1))
5 sampled_out_d1 <= 1’b1;
For the sake of space we are not showing the modelling code for the watched data d2 but it is symmetric
to the code shown above for d1 and can be obtained by replacing d1 by d2. The only difference is that
we will not include the arbit window term for computing the seen d2 expression. We now define two
key constraints required for ensuring we do not run into spurious failures at the time of checking. These
are that the two watched data words are distinct from one another and that d1 arrives before d2. Again,
assuming default clocking in SVA these are shown below:
1 assume property (d1 != d2);
2 assume property (!sampled_in_d1 |-> !sampled_in_d2);
We now define our key ordering check which can be formalized in SVA as:
Master Assertion
assert property (sampled_in_d1 && sampled_in_d2 && !sampled_out_d1 |-> !sampled_out_d2);
The above check will exhaustively verify all combinations of specific data word at all time points and will
flag an error if the ordering check is broken. We additionally verify a liveness property which establishes
that whatever went into the design comes out eventually. Even though this check does not establish any
ordering it does establish that no data loss happens. Liveness properties are extremely hard to prove
specially on deep FIFOs, but as we have a valid proof of the ordering property, we can assume that and
then the proof of liveness property is discharged within seconds of wall-clock time by the model checker.
The property is shown below. Note that we prove this only for one of the watched data words not both as
this is sufficient to find any data loss bugs.
Liveness
assert property (sampled_in_d1 |-> ##[0:$] sampled_out_d1);
4.3 Soundness of abstraction
We have taken a practical approach to establish that the abstraction used is safe (does not miss real bugs)
and appropriate (does not find spurious bugs). The way we do this is by mutating the underlying design
being verified to introduce a range of bugs. We then rerun the assertions in the model checker to check
if the key properties (in this case the ordering property) fails. If it does, then the property used and the
abstraction model is adequate and is safe. If the abstraction was too abstract, it would result in spurious
failures on designs where there are no bugs. If the abstraction was too tight and could mask some of
the bugs then during mutation the ordering property will not necessarily fail thereby flagging that the
abstraction was not able to catch a real bug (which is inserted by mutation). We employ hand-mutation as
the first port of call as we are able to identify a range of interesting control and data registers to mutate
pretty easily — something which is not yet possible with an automatic tool based mutation. Tool based
mutations [27] are not clever enough to identify the control registers the way a human being can. Most
tool-injected faults are quite simple stuck-at type faults, which are not adequate to unearth some potential
bugs.
4.4 Smart Tracker: Single Transaction Abstraction
Using two transactions to model ordering checks is intuitive; however it is not necessarily the best possible
way in terms of obtaining model checking performance. It needs two registers for modeling sampling in
events and another two for sampling out events requiring in total 4 of these along with a read seen
register. We now introduce what we call as a single transaction abstraction [28] designed using a counter.
It is shown in Figure 1 on the left hand side.
Our technique is based on tracking a watched data as it traverses inside the FIFO from the point it gets
accepted on the input interface to the point it leaves the output interface of the design. The key idea in
this abstraction however is to track only one symbolic watched data (shown as d below) using a tracking
counter. We do not store any other input data words (accepted in the design) in our testbench model. We
only ever have to track the relative displacement of the trace of data words ahead of the watched data –
providing to us a very powerful method of abstracting away the storage (in our testbench) of all the other
data words saving on state-space search for the model checker.
Whenever a new data word gets accepted on the input interface the tracking counter (shown as
tracking counter below) increments by one if the data word is not the watched data. Whenever a stored
data word in the FIFO design leaves it on a read, the tracking counter in the formal testbench decrements
by one. When the watched data appears on the input interface and gets accepted inside the FIFO we freeze
the increment of the tracking counter and only allow the counter to decrement on reads. This way at the
time of sampling in the watched data we know how many data values were ahead of this watched data
and therefore whenever the tracking counter reaches 1 we expect the watched data to appear at the output
in the same or following clock cycle (depends on the implementation of the read logic in the FIFO design).
If the watched data was to be ever reordered, lost, corrupted or duplicated - its history will be affected and
the counter based check will be able to detect it thereby flagging the bug in the design. The model checker
chooses all possible data words (at all possible time points) to be the watched data through symbolic
processing of SAT based encoding of the combined design, our formal model, and any constraints and
assertions.
We now show the relevant aspects of the modeling code. As was the case with the two transaction
abstraction, we keep the watched data arbitrary but fixed. This is done by using the $stable operator in
SVA. We also employ here an additional undriven wire arbit window to get extra non-determinism which
gives us the ability to control which version of the watched data will be sampled in. The sampled in
register is set when we have a write handshake (w hsk), and the watched data has not been already
sampled in (i.e. incr is high) and the watched data appears on the input port (w data) and the undriven
wire arbit window is set to 1 (i.e., this watched data is the data word that will be sampled in). It is quite
possible that we have a write handshake and the very same watched data appears on the input port but
the arbit window is not set to 1. In this case this instance of watched data will not be sampled in. The
write and the read handshake signals w hsk and r hsk respectively control the increment (incr) and the
decrement (decr) of the tracking counter. The $clog2 operator is a standard operator in SystemVerilog for
calculating the logarithm to base 2. The parameter DEPTH is the depth of the FIFO whereas WIDTH is the
size of the data word.
1 localparam DEPTH_BITS = $clog2(DEPTH);
2 logic [WIDTH-1:0] d;
3 assume property ($stable(d));
4 assign incr = w_hsk && !sampled_in;
5 assign decr = r_hsk && !sampled_out;
6 always @(posegde clk or negedge rst)
7 if (!rst)
8 sampled_in <= 1’b0;
9 else if (w_data==d && incr && arbit_window)
10 sampled_in <= 1’b1;
The register sampled out gets set when we are ready to sample out the watched data. This happens when
the tracking counter is 1, and we have sampled in the watched data and we are ready to read (r hsk is
high) and have not read out the watched data yet (decr is high). All of these conditions are defined by the
signal must read shown below.
1 assign must_read = (tracking_counter==1) && sampled_in && decr;
2 always @(posegde clk or negedge rst)
3 if (!rst)
4 sampled_out <= 1’b0;
5 else if (must_read)
6 sampled_out <= 1’b1;
The tracking counter is then defined below. The counter will increment on a write handshake (w hsk)
provided we have not sampled in the watched data (d) yet and would decrement on a read handshake
provided we have not read out the watched data (i.e., sampled out register is set).
1 always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)
2 if (!rst)
3 tracking_counter <= {DEPTH_BITS+1{1’b0}};
4 else
5 tracking_counter <= tracking_counter + incr - decr;
The assertion to verify data integrity and ordering then becomes:
Master Assertion
assert property (must_read |=> (r_data==d));
The assertion says that when the right condition for reading out the watched data is set then in the
following clock cycle the watched data appears on the output data port. A one cycle delay in this case is
due to a one cycle latency in the FIFO design around when read happens and when data comes out. If the
bug in the design is related to data loss, data duplication, data corruption, or ordering the assertion will
fail flagging an error with a counter example. This happens since the model checker tries to instantiate all
possible data values to the watched data and chooses all time points to sample in the watched data. The
liveness property (shown below) is also verified here. It checks that whatever data has gone in the FIFO
comes out and is not lost. It does not however check for ordering correctness.
Liveness
assert property (sampled_in |-> ##[0:$] sampled_out);
4.5 Invariants: Going beyond abstraction
Both the above models are efficient when compared to methods where one uses another reference FIFO
design as a testbench. However as the FIFO depths increase, despite the abstraction the performance
of model checkers worsen. To cope with this, we devised a family of invariants that we could prove as
auxiliary helper asserts and when these are proven and later assumed it provides a dramatic turn around
in proof times. The key invariants used are shown below. The invariants need information about the
micro-architectural implementation of the FIFO which in our case happens to be the circular two pointer
(read and write) based implementation and invariants once proven would be true of all reachable states
from reset in our case. Invariants are also sometimes referred to as safety properties in the literature [3]
but when we refer to invariants we mean auxiliary properties that may be useful to prove the main safety
or liveness property. In this way we do provide a dramatic increase in model checker performance as they
help to reduce the state-space search.
I4 Positional invariant tells the tool where exactly in the DUT the tracked value is. This is calculated
as function of read pointer and the tracking counter.
I3 Once the tracked value is in the system then the tracking counter is in between the read and the
write pointers.
I2 If the tracking value has not entered the system then the counts between the DUT and the abstract
model agree.
I1 If the tracking value has not entered in the system then it couldn’t have left it.
The positional invariant is the key invariant required for proving the ordering property. As it turns out
proving this key invariant is as hard if not harder sometimes than the ordering property itself. However,
some other auxiliary properties are much easier to prove than the positional invariant and if these are
Fig. 2. This graph shows the time taken using the single transaction abstraction. On the Y-axis is the CPU time in seconds whilst on the X-axis is
the DEPTH of the FIFOs. The curve shown in RED depicts the time taken to prove the positional invariant (I1) by proving and then assuming the
other auxiliary invariants (I2), (I3) and (I4) first. Once I4 is proven the time it takes to prove the ordering property is shown in BLUE. The lines in black
and green show what it takes to prove the positional invariant and the ordering property without using any assume-guarantee flow and auxiliary
invariants. This results in the model checker running out of capacity after consuming 24 hours of CPU time for a 16 deep FIFO. The combined
benefit of using abstraction, invariants and assume-guarantee is quite significant. We are able to verify ordering correctness property for FIFOs as
deep as 8192 in 518 seconds. Moreover, using our approach the FIFO verification run time scales linearly as the FIFO DEPTH scales exponentially
for the positional invariant. Most importantly for the key ordering property the curve for the run time remains nearly constant.
proven and subsequently assumed then the proof times of the positional invariant scale linearly with the
depth of the FIFO. We scripted an assume-guarantee flow which can take the easier invariants first to
prove and then assume them to prove the harder ones. Using our flow, we will prove invariants in the
following order (I4) followed by (I3) then (I2) and lastly (I1). What we additionally did was to use the
same invariants with the two transaction abstraction model. We only applied this to one of the watched
data words - the first to arrive in the design which in our case was d1 and this was sufficient to give us
scalability. Once the ordering property is proven we can assume it to prove the liveness property R4 which
says all accepted input data words must eventually come out.
4.6 Results
When we tested the smart tracker abstraction with assume-guarantee flow we obtained the results shown
in Figure 2. This graph shows the time taken using the single transaction abstraction. On the Y-axis is the
CPU time in seconds whilst on the X-axis is the DEPTH of the FIFOs. The curve shown in RED depicts
the time taken to prove the positional invariant (I1) by proving and then assuming the other auxiliary
invariants (I2), (I3) and (I4) first. Once I4 is proven the time it takes to prove the ordering property is
shown in BLUE. The lines in black and green show what it takes to prove the positional invariant and
the ordering property without using any assume-guarantee flow and auxiliary invariants. This results in
the model checker running out of capacity after consuming 24 hours of CPU time for a 16 deep FIFO.
The combination of using assume-guarantee flow together with invariants and abstractions allowed us to
verify FIFOs as deep as 8192 the run time was 518 seconds (under 9 minutes!).
When we compare our two abstractions (using the assume-guarantee flow with both using invariants)
we got the graphs shown in Figure 3. As it is obvious from the graphs, the run time for the ordering
property using both the abstractions is of the order of seconds. The combined benefit of using abstraction,
invariants and assume-guarantee is quite significant and makes the FIFO verification run time scales linearly
as the FIFO DEPTH scales exponentially for the positional invariant. Most importantly for the key ordering
property the curve for the run time remains nearly constant with increasing exponential DEPTH. The smart
tracker abstraction is however more efficient than the two transaction abstraction as it has to perform
checking with respect to only one symbolic watched data and not two. This creates much less model
checking overhead for smart tracker abstraction. By proving and then assuming the ordering property we
are able to prove the liveness property within seconds/minutes of wall-clock time.
Fig. 3. Comparison of single transaction and two transaction methods. Single transaction methodology (curve shown on right) is clearly more
efficient than the two transaction (curve shown on left) as is obvious from the slope of the RED lines (which is less steep for single transaction)
depicting proof times for the positional invariant in the graph.
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Fig. 4. A Simple Arbiter. It has interesting arbitration rules to check and even though does not have a lot of state in it; still has stallers, FIFOs
and FSMs. To verify a design of this size with high confidence using dynamic simulation requires non-trivial investment of effort, is not necessarily
reusable, and will certainly take a lot longer to converge in terms of getting good coverage than the results we obtained using our formal modeling.
We found several bugs in different FIFOs under development. Most of these were functional bugs
but notably the bug that caught the most attention with designers was a bug related to redundant area
(consuming dynamic power) in a low power optimized FIFO design.
5 A SIMPLE ARBITER
We now present a case study of a simple arbiter which arbitrates on four incoming requestors. This is
shown in Figure 4 by four input interfaces R0 to R3. Requests are accepted through a handshake protocol
and are directed to any of the four outputs G0 to G3 where they get granted again on a handshake. On the
input side, in a clock cycle one can have up to 4 handshakes, meaning all 4 input requestors may wake
up in a single clock cycle but on the output side, at most one handshake is allowed in a single clock cycle.
It is not a requirement that on every clock cycle we must have input/output activity. It is quite possible
that once incoming requests are accepted they may not be granted for several clock cycles on the output
interface.
In Figure 4 on the left is the case where a stream of transactions originate from input requestors going
towards different outputs. It does not matter if one input requestor got accepted before the other. However,
the rule is that whatever got accepted at each input interface must be transferred to the correct output
interface and in the same order in which they were accepted at the input interface. On the right side of the
figure we show the case when all of the input requestors are competing for the same output G3 and all
of the input requests were accepted in the same clock cycle. In this case a priority order is enforced and
the requestor with a lower index has a higher priority. Thus in the diagram shown on the right, R0 will
be granted access to G3 before R1, R1 granted before R2, and R2 granted before R3. If however requests
originated on two different input requestors in two different clock cycles being sent to the same output interface
then first-come-first-serve has precedence over priority ordering. For example if R1 was accepted before
R0 and they were both competing for G3 then R1 would be granted access to G3 before R0. The last rule
which is not very difficult to verify is the case when different input requestors send requests to different
output interfaces. In this case it is just sufficient to check that these requests do get granted, but this check
need not be encoded explicitly as the first-come-first-serve check that we model checks that no data is
dropped, duplicated or corrupted and is correctly ordered and that the arbitration is fair.
Our approach in verifying this arbiter is similar to verifying a FIFO in that we will use the concept
of a watched value to observe and track. However, whereas in the FIFO we were watching a data value,
in this case we will observe a symbolic watched requestor (watched req). The other key signals used in
our model are the usual suspects here - sampling registers (sampled in and sampled out), wires (incr
and decr) for increment and decrement respectively, arbit window for creating non-determinism and a
new wire (leading req) that calculates how many requests are leading (ahead) of the watched requestor.
Below we declare a watched requestor (watched req) and declare it to be stable.
1 logic watched_req;
2 assume property ($stable(watched_req));
On every incoming request into the arbiter on a non-watched port increment the counter. The hand-
shake signals hsk in and hsk out get high if one or more handshakes happen on the input or output
respectively. Once a handshake happens on the watched requestor freeze the counter increment. If multiple
requests arrive at the same time as the requests on the watched requestor, a mask is used to only increment
the counter by the number of requestors with greater than or equal to priority as the watched requestor.
This then keeps track of where the request from the watched requestor sits in the arbitration queue. You
only ever need to monitor the first request on the watched requestor. On every handshake at the output
port for the non-watched requestor decrement the counter. When the counter becomes one expect the data
from the watched requestor to appear at the output port. The counter’s increment and decrement needs
adjustment based on priority encoding. This in our example becomes the peripheral code which can be
tweaked. The SVA built-in function $countones simply counts the number if 1s in a given vector.
1 assign incr = sampled_in ? ’h0 : leading_req;
2 assign leading_req = ready_to_sample ? ($countones(hsk_in & mask[watched_req])):$countones(hsk_in);
3 assign decr = |hsk_out && !sampled_out;
4 assign ready_to_sample = hsk_in[watched_req] && arbit_window;
5 always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)
6 if (!rst)
7 sampled_in <= 1’b0;
8 else if (ready_to_sample)
9 sampled_in <= 1’b1;
10 always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)
11 if (!rst)
12 sampled_out <= 1’b0;
13 else if (sampled_in && hsk_out[watched_req])
14 sampled_out <= 1’b1;
With the increment and decrement now adjusted for this design accordingly the tracking counter now
looks similar to the counter in the smart tracker abstraction. The term that decides when it is permissible
to observe the watched requestor’s data out is given by the term must read.
1 always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)
2 if (!rst)
3 tracking_counter <= ’h0;
4 else
5 tracking_counter <= tracking_counter + incr - decr;
6 assign must_read = (tracking_counter==1) && sampled_in && hsk_out_glbl;
The only check needed to verify all the required arbitration requirements is shown below:
Master Assertion
assert property (sampled_in && hsk_out_glbl && (tracking_counter == 1) |=> sampled_out);
Fig. 5. A Memory sub-system arbiter’s high level block diagram showing at an abstract level how multiple concurrent transactions originate from
the requestors R0 to R8 directed towards the memory banks B0 to B7.
The scoreboard and a single assertion is able to check all the key verification requirements as follows:
1) Starvation: By using a symbolic watched requestor, the solution will check all requestors and make
each one the watched requestor. If any requestor was starved access then it would never be seen
coming out of the arbiter and we would see the assertion failing.
2) Fairness: The solution encapsulates the method to check for fairness automatically. This is done by
checking that each requestor is serviced when it is expected to be. This means that if any requestor
was serviced unfairly with respect to the arbitration scheme then the assertion would fail.
3) Data-Integrity: Is checked by ensuring that the correct data comes out at the output when that
requestors data is expected.
4) Race freedom: Because this is based around enforcing the priority and checking every requestor is
serviced when it should be, if there were any race conditions which resulted in incorrect order of
service then the assertion would fail.
5) Deadlock freedom: If the system was to get into deadlock then it would not be able to process
any more requestors and we would not see the watched requestor on the output port in some
scenarios. Because by using formal all scenarios are tested there would be an assertion failure in
the case of deadlock.
5.1 Results
We tested our solution on a range of arbiters including priority based, first-come-first-serve and round-
robin. In all of these cases our solution was able to obtain exhaustive proofs of the main assertion within
seconds of wall-clock time for up to 4-8 requestors. When we increased the requestors to up to 128, the run
times for exhaustive proofs were of the order of minutes. We also found bugs in some of these arbiters.
6 A MEMORY SUB-SYSTEM ARBITER
We now show how we apply the arbiter and FIFO verification methodology for verifying a complex
memory sub-system arbiter. Arbiters such as this one are complex as they have plenty of control and state
needed to achieve high-performance arbitration. Typical data structures used in the design include register
files, FIFOs, random stallers, and FSMs. The mesh of all of these creates a significant verification challenge
for both simulation and formal. Whereas with formal we are able to get a rigorous proof of correctness it is
not without a good methodology. Figure 5 shows at an abstract level how multiple concurrent transactions
originate from the requestors R0 to R8 directed towards the memory banks B0 to B7. This arbiter has three
groups of incoming requestors, arbitrating over 4 groups of memory banks organized as 2 banks in each
group. For simplicity we flatten the incoming requestors and label them R0 to R8 and the memory banks
as B0 to B7. In practice, the requestors R0 to R3 are in one group; R4 to R7 in another whilst R8 is the last
group. Each requestor within R0 to R3 or R4 to R7 is also referred to as a requestor instance.
The key arbitration rules [29] that are challenging to verify for this arbiter are:
1) First-come-first-serve: Requests originating from any requestor instance from any group sent to
any of the memory banks must arrive at the bank in the same order as they were received at the
input requestor.
2) Priority order: Requests originating from the requestor instances of the same group competing
for the same memory bank must have a priority order. For example if multiple instances from
the group R0 to R3 sent requests in the same cycle to a bank Bi where i ranges from 0 to 7; then
requests from R0 should be accepted before requests from R1, requests from R1 before R2, and
R2 before R3. The same rule applies to requestor instances from the second requestor group R4 to
R7.The last group has a lone instance so priority order rule is not applicable to it.
3) Out-of-order: If requests from different requestor groups competed for the same bank then any of
the accepted requests can arrive at the given bank in any order.
6.1 Scenario splitting abstraction
We exploit a new technique here to isolate the different scenarios. The first scenario can focus only on
the first-come-first-serve behaviour and mask away the tracking or observation of any multi-instance
requests. The second scenario can focus on multi-instance activity but narrow down the observation to
only those requests that are directed to the same bank and mask away any tracking and observation
logic for other scenarios. The last scenario would be to observe traffic originating from any requestor
going to any bank and ensuring that these requests are received and not lost. However, this scenario is
automatically subsumed by the previous two scenarios which are a lot more stricter where we can prove
that both first-come-first-serve and priority ordering is correct. If these behaviours are true then it is certain
that all requests are arriving at all the banks.
The use of scenario splitting is another form of abstraction in that it allows one to focus the verification
to be on one scenario at a time and allows us to abstract away the non-interesting scenarios. This is the
key to our approach in verification of these designs where a combined tracking and observation logic
encapsulated in a single model (as in the previous section) is limiting for performance and tractability
of the formal proofs. Once we set out to build the formal testbench by exploiting scenario splitting
the rest of the methodology falls in place directly from the previous sections - combination of the
smart tracker abstraction for first-come-first-serve verification and the two transaction abstraction and its
extensions for proving priority order. The basic data structures we use in the modelling of the assertions
are shown below. It is obvious looking at these data structures that the general scheme here is to
replicate the FIFO single transaction method using in this case an array of tracking counters, in total
requiring 64 ((REQ− 1)× (INST− 1)× (GRP− 1)× (BNK− 1)) tracking counters each MAX+ 1 wide to count
MAX transactions.
1 wire [BNK-1:0] ready_to_sample_out [REQ-2:0][INST-1:0][GRP-1:0];
2 wire [3:0] decr_tc [REQ-2:0][INST-1:0][GRP-1:0][BNK-1:0];
3 wire [INST-1:0] hsk_in [REQ-2:0];
4 wire [BNK-1:0] hsk_out [GRP-1:0];
5 reg [MAX:0] tracking_cnt [REQ-2:0][INST-1:0][GRP-1:0][BNK-1:0];
6 reg [BNK-1:0] seen_in_watched_id [REQ-2:0][INST-1:0][GRP-1:0];
7 reg [BNK-1:0] seen_out_watched_id [REQ-2:0][INST-1:0][GRP-1:0];
Just as we had ready to sample in and ready to sample out registers in FIFO verification, we have these
here as well. The only difference here is that we have an array of these just as we have an array of
increment, decrement and sampled in and sampled out registers. The basic principle remains the same in
that the ready to sample out registers get set to 1 when the corresponding tracking counter (tracking cnt)
is reduced to 1 and we have sampled in the watched identifiers (seen in watched id) and we are
decrementing (meaning we haven’t seen the watched id appear at the expected bank and we are having a
handshake at the bank interface akin to reading the watched id out akin through a FIFO pop).
The code shown below keeps track of what ids have been seen in at the input interface directed to which
group and bank. This is done by employing a generate− for loop which tracks where the requests are
going to (indexed by group (g i) and bank (b i)) and originating from a given requestor and instance
which is shown for requestor index 0 and instance 0.
1 generate
2 for (g_i=0; g_i<GRP; g_i=g_i+1)
3 for (b_i=0; b_i<BNK; b_i=b_i+1)
4 assign hsk_out [g_i][b_i] = group_bank_valid[g_i][b_i] && group_bank_enable[g_i][b_i];
5 always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)
6 if (!rst)
7 seen_in_watched_id[0][0][g_i][b_i] <= 1’b0;
8 else if (hsk_in[0][0] && req_out[0][0][g_i][b_i] && (data[0]==watched_id) && !other_req_active[0])
9 seen_in_watched_id[0][0][g_i][b_i] <= 1’b1;
10 endgenerate
We now show the array of wires for increment and decrement indexed per requestor, per instance, per
group, and per bank. This ensures we keep track of all requests originating from each requestor on
an instance basis and track which group and bank they are directed to. This needs to be done for the
sample out registers (seen out watched id), ready to sample out wires as well as the tracking counters
(tracking cnt).
1 generate
2 for (r_i=0; r_i<REQ-1; r_i=r_i+1)
3 for (inst_i=0; inst_i<INST; inst_i=inst_i+1)
4 assign hsk_in[r_i][inst_i] = req_valid[r_i][inst_i] && req_enable[r_i][inst_i];
5 for (g_i=0; g_i<GRP; g_i=g_i+1)
6 for (b_i=0; b_i<BNK; b_i=b_i+1)
7 assign incr_tc[r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i] = hsk_in[r_i][inst_i] && req_out[r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i];
8 assign decr_tc[r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i] = !seen_out_watched_id[r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i] &&
9 hsk_out[g_i][b_i];
10 assign ready_to_sample_out[r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i] = (tracking_cnt[r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i]==’h1) &&
11 seen_in_watched_id[r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i] &&
12 decr_tc[r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i];
13 always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)
14 if (!rst)
15 seen_out_watched_id[r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i] <= 1’b0;
16 else if (ready_to_sample_out[r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i])
17 seen_out_watched_id[r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i] <= 1’b1;
18
19 always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)
20 if (!rst)
21 tracking_cnt[r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i] <= {MAX+1{1’b0}};
22 else
23 tracking_cnt[r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i] <= tracking_cnt[r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i] +
24 incr_tc [r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i] -
25 decr_tc [r_i][inst_i][g_i][b_i];
26 endgenerate
We now show the template assertion for checking first-come-first-serve property. Using a generate loop
64 of these are generated - from the cross product of the set of multi-instance requestors (REQ− 1) and
number of groups and banks ((GRP− 1)× (BNK− 1)).
Master assertion for Ordering
1 generate
2 for (g_i=0; g_i<GRP; g_i=g_i+1)
3 for (b_i=0; b_i<BNK; b_i=b_i+1)
4 assert property (ready_to_sample_out[0][0][g_i][b_i] && !other_req_active[0]
5 |->
6 (OUT_ID[g_i][b_i] == watched_id));
7 endgenerate
The sample assertion shown here is one of the 8 ((REQ− 1)× INST) assertions coded explicitly in the
generate loop. The for loops make sure that each of the explicitly coded assert within the generate loop
is unrolled for each bank (BNK) for all groups (GRP). We maintain a side condition in the antecedent of
the assertions using a predicate !other req active which ensures that only one fixed instance of a fixed
requestor is actively sending the requests and not any other instance in a given clock cycle. This is to
ensure we mask away any noise that is not needed in proving the property in question which is that a
stream of requests originating from any requestor instance remains ordered on arrival at a given bank.
By keeping this guard we are able to seperate out different scenarios for first-come-first-serve checks
for each bank with respect to each requestor instance. There are 8 such predicates ((REQ− 1)× INST),
where REQ is fixed at 3 and INST at 4 for this design. We would like to point out that for the requestor
with a single instance we don’t have to harness any generate loop hence we have REQ− 1. Each of these
assertions prove within an hour of wall clock time.
We now show how we structure the properties that reason about multi-instance activity from a
requestor group. As pointed out there are two requestor groups with 4 instances each and a third requestor
group with a lone instance. The challenge is in proving properties which check that “if multiple instances
in the same requestor group accepted incoming data being sent to the same bank then the priority order
on instances is respected with respect to the bank”. We decompose this overall check into 11 different cases
We now show how we structure the properties that reason about multi-instance activity from a requestor
group. As pointed out there are two requestor groups with 4 instances each and a third requestor group
with a lone instance. The challenge is in proving properties which check that “if multiple instances in
the same requestor group accepted incoming data being sent to the same bank then the priority order on
instances is respected with respect to the bank”. We decompose this overall check into 11 different cases
(CASES=11) per requestor group (REQ=2) with multiple instances (in our case these are 2) per group (GRP=4)
per bank (BNK=2). In total we have REQ× GRP× BNK× CASES = 176 assertions generated from generate
loops coded in the following manner. The number 0 in seen multi inst[r i][g i][b i][0] denotes the case
split number; it is the initial case that talks about instances 0 and 1 of a requestor r i sending data to a
bank b i in the same clock cycle. We have six such cases of two instances active at the same time. We have
four cases of three instances active at a time, and one case of all four instances sending data to the same
bank.
Master assertion for Priority
1 reg [CASES-1:0] seen_multi_inst[REQ-1:0][GRP-1:0][BNK-1:0];
2 generate
3 for (r_i=0;r_i<REQ-1;r_i=r_i+1)
4 for (g_i=0;g_i<GRP;grp_i=g_i+1)
5 for (b_i=0;b_i<BNK;b_i=b_i+1)
6 as_check_arbitration_i0_and_i1:
7 assert property (seen_multi_inst [r_i][g_i][b_i][0] && !req_out [r_i][0][g_i][b_i]
8 |->
9 !req_out [r_i][1][g_i][b_i]);
10 endgenerate
Each assertion comes with almost a dual-like cover property which helps to sanity check for those scenarios
where the proof of the above assertion may come out as a valid proof but only due to vacuity. Vacuity
can happen due to the way implication properties work in SVA specifically and logic in general; where a
failing antecedent in an implication can cause the overall proof to be declared valid. To rule those cases
out we just write an adjoining cover to ensure that it is valid and does not fail.
6.2 Results
It should be noted how the above property is identical to the two transaction based FIFO verification
method we showed. All of the generated properties prove within 5-7 minutes of wall-clock time. In
practice we just select all of these at once and within 5-7 minutes we are able to finish off all the 176
proofs. Similarly for the 64 ordering properties we prove all of these at once and within an hour of
wall-clock time we are done with the exhaustive proofs.
We would like to emphasize that we applied our methodology on this design once extensive simulation
had been done and bugs had been fixed. We did not find any further bugs in this design; we did however
exhaustively prove that there were no bugs in implementation of the key arbitration rules outlined above
which made the whole methodology very powerful as it provided the much needed assurance levels.
7 SYNCHRONIZER
In this section we will show how the smart tracker abstraction of Section 4 is directly applicable in
verifying synchronizers. A synchronizer is a device used in any environment where multiple clocks are
used, specially when these clocks may have edges quite close to each other. This gives rise to a multitude of
problems such as meta-stability, reconvergence, and loss of data. A commonly used design implementation
for a synchronizer uses a gray-coded FIFO driven from multiple clocks from different domains. There are a
range of checks that are exercised to validate these designs such as read/acknowledge behaviour on both
write and read interfaces, metastability checks and checks on data integrity. Verification of data-integrity,
ordering and proving absence of data loss is again a key requirement that not only requires exhaustive
proofs and high assurance, it is also a challenge for both simulation and formal due to multiple clocks and
possible combination of meta-stable events causing problems with data.
We show the important bits of the modelling code to highlight our solution. The important thing to note
below is the use of different clocks - write clock (wclk) and read clock (rclk) in modelling the sampling
in and sampling out events. Other than that, the basic declarations of wires such as arbit window, incr,
decr, and must read remain here just like in the smart tracker abstraction. We also keep the watched
data word stable and assume the existence of write and read handshake signals driven by request and
acknowledge pairs on the input and output interfaces respectively. The registers used for defining the start
and the stop events are the usual sampled in and sampled out registers.
1 localparam DEPTH_BITS = $clog2(DEPTH);
2 logic [WIDTH-1:0] d;
3 assume property ($stable(d));
4 assign incr = w_hsk && !sampled_in;
5 assign decr = r_hsk && !sampled_out;
6 always @(posegde wclk or negedge rst)
7 if (!rst)
8 sampled_in <= 1’b0;
9 else if (w_data==d && incr && arbit_window)
10 sampled_in <= 1’b1;
11 always @(posegde rclk or negedge rst)
12 if (!rst)
13 sampled_out <= 1’b0;
14 else if (r_data==d && decr)
15 sampled_out <= 1’b1;
We now show how the tracking counter is implemented in this case by employing two different counters
- one that tracks the outstanding write count ahead of the watched data word (w count) and other that
tracks the outstanding read count (r count). The tracking counter itself is simply the difference between
(w count) and (r count).
1 always @(posedge wclk or negedge rst)
2 if (!rst)
3 w_count <= {DEPTH_BITS+1{1’b0}};
4 else
5 w_count <= w_count + incr;
6 always @(posedge rclk or negedge rst)
7 if (!rst)
8 r_count <= {DEPTH_BITS+1{1’b0}};
9 else
10 r_count <= r_count + decr;
11 assign tracking_counter = w_count - r_count;
The assertion to verify data integrity and ordering relies on using must read which gets the value 1
when the tracking counter has reduced to 1 and the watched data word was sampled in before and there
was a read handshake in the current clock cycle of the read clock.
assign must_read = tracking_counter==1 && sampled_in && decr;
The assertion then is shown below. It is worth pointing out that this is explicitly clocked by the positive
edge of the read clock rclk.
Master Assertion
assert property (@(posedge rclk) must_read |=> (r_data==d))
7.1 Results
We tested our solution on several clock ratios for varying depths of the synchronizer FIFO and the results
were similar to what we showed for the FIFO using smart tracker abstraction. There was however a delta
increase in time over the FIFO verification runtimes due to multiple clocks being used here and we did
find this delta increase linearly as clock ratios increased from 1:2 to 1:32.
8 A PACKET BASED DESIGN
In this section we will introduce our last case study of this paper. This design is also a data transport
design but unlike a FIFO or an arbiter where the data does not change in size as it travels from input to
the output; in this design the data can be dropped, shrunk or grown. This design is representative of a family
of designs used in networking domains where data packets regularly go through this form of elasticity.
The drop capability allows the design at any time to drop the packet at the head of the queue. The
elastic capability to shrink or grow the data is controlled by an input called elasticate. To decide when
to resize the data we check if the packet queue is greater than half full. If it is half full and the input
elasticate is high then the design looks at the lower three bits of the packet at the head of the queue.
Having decoded this the output mask will be updated and the number of valid data bits read out in the
future will change accordingly for all the packets in flight.
The modelling code shown below shows the key fragments of our abstract model — note the addition
of an internal mask signal (internal mask) that captures the snapshot of how much shrinking/growth is
to be done when appropriate conditions are set on the input. The internal mask is used to decide what
fraction of a full packet size is being read out. The bits are reset to all 1 so the entire (100%) packet size
should be checked. If the update packet size conditions are met then the data at the head of the queue is
checked. If the value of these bits is greater than or equal to the current value of i then that bit will be set
to 1 otherwise it will be set to 0. So if the head of the packet was of value 2 then the internal mask becomes
00111. This means we now expect the packet to be 60% of its original size.
1 reg [SHRINK_VECTOR-1:0] internal_mask;
2 genvar i;
3 generate for (i=0;i<SHRINK_VECTOR;i++)
4 always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)
5 if (!rst)
6 internal_mask[i] <= 1’b1;
7 else if ((in_flight_counter > ((2**DEPTH_BITS)/2)) && elasticate)
8 if ({data[rptr][INTERNAL_MASK_HEADER-1:0]} >= i)
9 internal_mask[i] <= 1’b1;
10 else internal_mask[i] <= 1’b0;
11 endgenerate
This value of internal mask gets transformed into an actual mask that can be applied directly to the data
at the output. This is defined by output mask shown below. A counter in flight counter is used in the
design to just keep track of how many packets are there in the queue. It increments on every write and
decrements on a read or a drop. Please note that this counter in the design should not be confused with
the tracking counter used in our abstract model of the formal test bench which counts how many values
are ahead of the watched data.
1 wire [DATA_WIDTH-1:0] output_mask;
2 wire [DATA_WIDTH-1:0] output_mask_stretched;
3 assign mask_o = internal_mask;
4 assign output_mask_stretched = (2**(mask_o+1))-1;
5 assign output_mask = (2**(internal_mask+1))-1;
The rest of the abstract model now is very similar to how we modelled it for the FIFO with a slight
modification to the model to take into account the role of the drop signal which can drop the data. This
affects the model shown below in calculating assignments to decr and the ready to sample out signals.
The other signals used in the model below are the write handshake (w hsk), the read handshake (r hsk)
and the sampling registers – sampled in and sampled out – all defined in the usual way.
1 assign incr = w_hsk && !sampled_in;
2 assign decr = (r_hsk || drop) && !sampled_out;
3 assign ready_to_sample_out = (tracking_counter == 1) && sampled_in && decr && !drop;
Fig. 6. Results showing time taken to prove the master assertion vs depth of the pipe using assume guarantee flow and invariants
for a 32-bit wide data packet. Time here is not CPU time but real time in seconds. We should point out that in case of FIFO the
proof times for its master assertion remained nearly constant (see Figure 2); however in case of this design though the time taken
is still of the order of seconds, it does scale linearly and the slope of this increases linearly with increasing exponential depth of the
pipe. This is due to the fact that packets in this design may go through an elastic shrink-grow phase which increases the complexity
and the number of combinations to check.
The pivotal tracking counter used in the formal test bench is then defined as shown below.
1 always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)
2 if (!rst)
3 tracking_counter <= {(DEPTH_BITS+1){1’b0}};
4 else tracking_counter <= tracking_counter + incr - decr;
The assertion shown below establishes that every packet of data that has been read into the design and
has not been dropped is correctly read out, is not duplicated, is of the correct size, and remains correctly
ordered. Note that the check takes into account the packet resizing by performing a bitwise AND with the
appropriate mask registers.
Master assertion
assert property (ready_to_sample_out |=> ((data_o & output_mask_stretched) == (d & output_mask)));
8.1 Results
Using the same invariant flow as described in Section 4, we have been able to exhaustively prove these
features on this design up to 1024-deep. The time consumed in proving the master assertion is of the
order of seconds of real time, shown in Figure 6. This is possible by using abstraction, invariants and
our assume-guarantee flow. The class of invariants used here is similar to the ones we used for FIFO
verification. We would like to point out here that we carried out testing for a fixed depth of the pipe
against variable data width. That curve is also linear in time. Due to lack of space we cannot show this
here.
9 RELATED WORK
In this section we present some comparison points with respect to two other closely related pieces of work.
We would like to outline the key similarities and differences with these and would like to point out how
our method is new. We will provide these comparisons with respect to the following aspects: (a) Use of
symbolic variables (b) Formal models using counters (c) Invariants and Assume-Guarantee reasoning and
(d) Scenario splitting.
9.1 Use of symbolic variables
The use of symbolic variables to watch non-deterministically values or ports is similar to how it has been
done in the paper [10]. However the way we extended this by adding a counter based abstraction is new.
Symbolic variables are not used in this way by Benalycherif [19]. The impact of our work using counters
to perform abstraction and adding states to our model becomes more significant in the light of the speed
up we obtained with our smart tracker model for FIFO verification. In [24] we reported a speed up of
500 times compared to the best known commercial solution. Considering that conventional literature on
model checking and abstraction often considers counters to be bad for abstraction and as a consequence
they are black-boxed (meaning not complied in the design) this is a significant new finding. This is also
true of designs with FIFOs where conventional wisdom is about blackboxing them away. Our view is that
in practice when these components are abstracted away not only do we end up chasing spurious bugs but
also it is not practically sensible to verify designs without them when in fact a lot of bugs could be because
of them in the first place.
9.2 Formal models using counters
Our approach is similar to the one proposed by [19] in that we both choose to use counting as pivotal
way of modelling the main property for checking ordering although [19] never really modelled explicitly
any counters. In fact in their approach the authors have not used modelling at all. In [19] the authors
have formulated the theoretical connection between data independence and verification of ordering based
components. They identified two key conditions which they call sufficient conditions for identifying data
independence and also showed how a design such as a FIFO can be verified. The authors argue that
checking that “output data streams are samplings of input data streams” cannot be directly checked in
a practicable manner using the constructs of temporal property languages such as PSL and SVA and
argue that modelling code is required. This is something we agree with; however we do not agree with
the authors’ point of view that using glue logic in some modelling language is a bad thing. In fact we
found that a lot of scalability in formal comes precisely by way of identifying how to model things more
efficiently with glue logic and also allows one to have better controllability and observability something
that is also encouraged by [10]. We were able to scale our method massively to very deep FIFOs and we
are not sure how the method proposed by [19] scales in practice. There are however further interesting
correspondences and divergences between our method and their’s. The first condition that they identified
was that if a given data word exits a design at any time, then it must have been captured into the design
at same or earlier time. This happens to be equivalent to one of our invariants I4 (though our definition is
contra-positive). The second condition they identified is not something we exploited at all in our work as
we didn’t find it necessary for our approach. This condition says that if one has two copies of the design
(RTL) driven by the same control logic and input data stream is identical for all time points other than that
one point where a watched data word is captured and if the values at input differ then there must be a
difference in the output values at the point where input data streams differ. We fail to see how by proving
a property which is based on their second condition would be necessary. In our work we establish one-
to-one correspondence between all data words that were accepted at the input interface and the ones that
leave the design at the output interface by proving the ordering property which uses all of the input data
words as watched words for tracking and ensures that whatever was accepted didn’t get lost, corrupted,
or duplicated in the design and also remained correctly ordered within the design. If the design had a bug
in which it can duplicate the data then there will be at least one instance of a value that will get duplicated
and will overwrite the watched data. It will affect the associated tracking counter in that when we expect
to see the watched data we will instead see one of the duplicated values appear at the output interface.
The positional invariant we used to scale our ordering proofs serves as a useful companion property that
gets failed in the presence of bugs in the design. We did not notice any corresponding property in the
work done by [19]. We are also not sure how well their PSL based properties shown for FIFO verification
scale as there is no data reported and lastly we are also not sure how much of their formalization was
reusable for different designs.
9.3 Invariants and Assume-Guarantee
We extended our abstraction model with invariants to accelerate the proof times of the ordering property
in many cases making the proof tractable in the first place. For example with the use of positional invariant
in case of FIFO verification, we were able to prove in less than a minute of wall-clock time, the key ordering
and liveness properties even with exponentially increasing depths of the FIFO. The proof of the positional
invariant itself scales linearly as depths of the FIFO increases exponentially. We are not aware of any
result from any other work where verification effort and time is scaling linearly (or remains constant) as
hardware configuration scales exponentially.
The performance boost we obtain in our methodology is not only due to using invariants or abstraction
but also leveraging the proofs of intermediate invariants using an assume-guarantee flow which we
scripted in-house. This is unique to our approach and we are not aware if [10] or [19] considered this.
The striking feature of using invariants in this way is that the process of finding these encourages
verification and design engineers alike to consider carefully aspects of micro-architectural specifications
which helps build the designs correct in the first place avoiding bugs, or finding more bugs through the
use of invariants as explicit checks. In our case one of the first design components that got fixed was a
low-power FIFO design where that bug was uncovered through an invariant. The use of assume-guarantee
the way we have used it is different from how Ken McMillan [9] used it to cope with circularity and loops
in designs.
9.4 Scenario splitting abstraction
The use of scenario splitting is another form of abstraction in that it allows one to focus the verification to
be on one scenario at a time and allows us to abstract away the non-interesting scenarios. This is the key to
our approach in the verification of memory subsystem arbiter where a combined tracking and observation
logic encapsulated in a single model (used in the verification of simple arbiters) is limiting for performance
and tractability of the formal proofs. The use of scenario splitting offers a natural abstraction for designs
such as these on top of smart-tracker and two-transaction abstraction. We are not aware if anyone else
considered this as part of a wider problem reduction strategy.
10 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented three key abstractions to address the verification of a range of different designs
ranging from simple library components such as FIFOs to simple and complex arbiters, multi-clocked
synchronizers and a packet based design used in networking. The use of abstractions together with
invariants and assume-guarantee flow provides a powerful methodology to scale and deploy formal
hardware verification on industrial strength designs in an automatic manner. We showed how one test-
bench for FIFO verification using a single ordering assertion check can verify 100 different types of FIFOs
for ordering correctness. Our solution for FIFO verification scales linearly in run time (for positional
invariant) or remains constant (for ordering assertion) as design configuration scales exponentially. For
arbiter synchronizer, and the packet based design the run time is of the order of seconds. Even for a
complex memory subsystem arbiter and a complex packet based design from networking the run time
ranges from minutes to an hour. It is not possible to obtain both exhaustive results and find corner case
bugs (such as redundant power consumption) with these run times using simulation or emulation. Using
a small set of abstractions to verify exhaustively a range of different hardware designs is a completely new
way of addressing the challenge of delivering high-assurance products in the market with shrinking time
schedules. In the future, we are planning on providing more automation for deducing invariants and to
establish that our abstraction is a Galois connection.
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